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Can You Own Your Personal Data?  
The HAT (Hub-Of-All-Things) Data Ownership Model 
 
 
This article is an expanded response to the invitation by the Royal Society, the 
British Academy and TechUK’s for the Data Governance seminar on Data 
ownership, rights and control, 3 October, 2018.  
 
 
 
Introduction and background 
 
Research on personal data-sharing in the economics of privacy (e.g. Acquisti 2010 
etc.) have found that disclosing personal data do bring benefits to individuals (See 
Akcura and Srinivasan 2005). However, such sharing also brings about costs and 
negative externalities, for example, privacy costs, and subjective and objective 
privacy harms. It has also been suggested that sweeping privacy regulation that 
result in firms not being able to obtain personal data will lead to opportunity cost 
and inefficiencies (Acquisti 2010; August and Tunca 2006; Van Zandt 2004; 
Anderson and de Palma 2005; Hann et al. 2006). 
 
With the increasing economic value of personal data, scholars have been polarised 
into two main camps. The first, regulatory camp advocates for privacy protection as 
an end in itself, regardless of economic consequences. The underlying notion of 
such an advocacy is that privacy is a human right to personal data protection. Yet, 
even if regulated, enforcement of regulation would be a challenge since there is no 
statutory authority on the Internet. Any attempt by national governments to 
enforce privacy regulations would just increase the likelihood of data-driven 
companies (whose profits depend significantly on data) to employ regulatory 
arbitrage, moving activities to jurisdictions outside the regulation. The second camp 
proposes that individuals could be assigned property rights to the information so 
that they are able to contract with third parties on how they might use it. This self-
regulatory framework advocates the exchange of data and data protection to 
increase aggregate welfare, emphasising market self-correction for efficiency 
outcomes and the regulators’ role as one of steering the market through a 
combination of incentives, disclosure policies and even liability (Acquisti 2010).  
Unfortunately, the practical implementation of a self-regulatory framework also 
faces huge challenges because many of the data exchange contracts are incomplete 
and there is very little transparency about the secondary uses for the data 
(Beresford, Kübler, and Preibusch 2010; Godel, Litchfield, and Mantovani 2012). 
Property rights are a challenge to exercise when the personal data is held by firms 
collecting the data and not by individuals themselves (Shapiro and Varian, 1997; 
Laudon 1996). Since personal data is often mixed with other data belonging to the 
firm, the lack of clear boundaries between personal data and non-personal data 
within corporate databases would make property rights over personal data within 
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firms too much of a challenge to implement and enforce. In addition, third parties 
buying and selling personal data could impose social costs on individuals since 
individuals are not directly involved in these transactions, resulting in the 
externalities that are not internalised by the firm (Godel, Litchfield, and Mantovani 
2012; Odlyzko 2003; Swire and Litan 1998; Acquisti 2010). All this leads us to 
conclude that individuals cannot meaningfully own or control personal data 
controlled by organisations under current technological systems.1 
 
Coasian economics suggest that it doesn’t matter who owns a good, just as long as 
its ownership – and the boundaries of that ownership – is clear, as a bargaining 
solution (trade) can emerge. We argue that personal data within organisations 
cannot meaningfully be “propertised”, leading to high transaction costs we 
currently see. Neither the regulatory nor the self-regulatory initiatives have made 
much headway in reducing externalities and governments are getting nervous, 
while consumer groups are demanding action. Some regulation in both the US 
(California Consumer Privacy Act of 20182) and Europe (GDPR) have increased the 
access rights of individuals and created legal frameworks for greater excludability. 
However, the volume of data being used and shared, the opacity of data contracts 
and regulatory arbitraging, make enforcement a challenge and there is still no 
evidence on its effectiveness. 
 
Engineering a new set of personal data rights for Individuals 
 
Work in market design through “microeconomic engineering” (Roth 1991) has 
shown that transactions and institutions matter, and could be redesigned to 
engender better market outcomes.  The challenge is to design a solution for the 
current situation in personal data that can internalise the current externalities and 
even reduce them and create more socially efficient outcomes. Evidence from the 
digital music market have shown that digital music piracy was lowered considerably 
when music could be downloaded or streamed legally through artist- or licensee-
led platforms such as last.fm, Spotify and Apple Music. If an artefact or platform 
can be economically designed and engineered such that personal data contracts 
are first party contracts with individuals themselves as both the generator and the 
contractor of personal data rights, these contracts would be direct and complete 
between the individual and firms, with less externalities.  In addition, if contracted 
digitally and online, such personal data rights could be available in real time and on 
demand, such as when a form needs filling or inventory personalised to a set of 
personal data. If that were possible, then contracts would be complete as 
individuals could contract whenever needed e.g. with a device such as a mobile 
phone, without the need for the collecting firm to store it for later use, which 
                                               
1 Many organisations claim you own the data they hold. For example, Facebook terms and conditions say 
explicitly that individuals own their data. However, we argue that ownership is a meaningless concept when 
individuals do not have the freedom to exercise rights over what they own - I.e. rights to use, exclude (stop 
someone from using) and transfer (give rights to someone else). In a similar concept to the physical body, 
individuals can own their bodies, yet may not have any freedom or rights, much like slavery. Ownership without 
freedom is therefore spurious, and we conclude that personal data held by corporations cannot be meaningfully 
owned. 
2 https://www.wired.com/story/california-unanimously-passes-historic-privacy-bill/  
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creates uncertainty and incompleteness. Indeed, if such a technological artefact 
could exist, individuals could even reuse and reshare data acquired from multiple 
applications for which they generate data (e.g. calendar, hotel bookings) to create 
better bundled sets of data for re-sharing, resulting in higher social efficiency and 
improved personal productivity. Finally, the ability to accumulate data through such 
an artefact could result in better quality multi-source data about the individuals 
themselves that can potentially be better for an insight and understanding of their 
health, habits and historical interactions in combination across multiple digital 
applications and industry siloes, all within the control of individuals, but fully 
shareable as data rights. 
 
The design of such an artefact is not as straightforward as creating a service to 
broker personal data. Personal data exist on the Internet under the technological 
control of multiple apps, websites and services; indeed any user account of an app 
would have some measure of personal data pertaining to the usage of that app, 
from sleeping hours to music listens. Any third party service provider who seeks to 
broker such data would immediately run afoul of intellectual property rights issues. 
How would such a data broker be any different from current tech giants that 
already have a lot of personal data, and one can argue, much more incentivised to 
keep it secure for individuals? The contracting party accessing personal data from 
the source on the Internet on behalf of individuals e.g. Spotify music listening data, 
is the data broker itself and therefore the contract is between Spotify and the data 
broker with the individual’s consent. Why would the data broker then be a better 
broker for the individual than Spotify themselves? Indeed, with increasing data 
collection abilities of such data brokers, should they exist, the moral hazard and 
security concerns would rise unless the data brokers become trusts in their own 
right, protected by some level of guarantee such as regulation, much like lawyers 
and psychiatrists.  
 
In addition, the reuse and resharing of data rights with others, even with 
individuals’ consent, can become problematic for data brokers because the original  
rights of the data continue to stay within the source. In other words, if a data 
broker collected Facebook data on an individual’s behalf, the data broker would 
have to abide by Facebook’s terms and conditions for reuse and resharing, even if 
individuals themselves are willing to contract on. Source data acquired by such data 
brokers therefore are encumbered and the rights may not be fully vested onto 
individuals themselves. Since data brokers are trading third party rights, a market 
for personal data through such a service model is unlikely to work. 
 
Property rights is therefore the most important factor for markets of a good to 
exist, and personal data as an economic good is no exception, although being in the 
digital domain, it would fall within the purview of Intellectual property rights (IPR) 
such as patents and copyrights. First party IPR over personal data is important 
because markets not only enable the exchange of a good, but trade the various 
exclusive rights associated with the good in terms of its use, exclusion and 
alienability (Demsetz 1967; Alston, Libecap, and Schneider 1995, Carruthers and 
Babb 2000). 
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For individuals to be an active participant in the data economy and to reduce 
externalities, first party IPR over their data must be economically engineered in 
some way. 
 
The previous section have concluded that personal data sitting in firms, which I 
term OPD (organisation-controlled personal data), cannot be sufficiently isolated to 
grant IPR to individuals,  even through data brokers. We propose a first party IPR 
access model for personal data through the design of a technological artefact, the 
HAT (Hub-of-All-Things). 
 
Individuals could use the access rights mandated by governments (e.g. European 
General Data Protection Regulation) to claim the data and instead of firm giving 
rights to individuals for their personal data, firms could be suppliers of the same 
data to individuals if they had the technological ability to hold it. The normal 
subject access model is to give individuals a file - a PDF or CSV file of their data. 
Individuals can download the data onto their own PC or devices. Unfortunately, 
personal data accessed in such a manner are not interoperable nor can they be 
easily reused and reshared. Individuals can’t take their sleeping hours on the 13 
September and combine this with their music listening data, for example, and share 
the data easily. However, the downloaded data does free it from the lien i.e. the 
rights of that data now sit with the individual as a co-producer of that data, and no 
longer with the firm. If such OPD access could be executed by a more flexible 
device that is similar to that of a PC, but one that makes it possible for the 
individual to reuse and reshare data more easily, first party IPR for personal data 
could be achieved. Better yet, if OPD access rights are real time and on demand, 
then there is a greater likelihood a primary market could form as and when 
contextual opportunities for data contracts emerge. 
 
As it happens, such real time, on demand OPD access rights are already partially 
granted by firms. They are granted to other firms through an interoperable 
standard access model called “API access”, where personal data of one user of an 
application is shared with another application, with user consent. For example, 
Spotify grants Sonos speakers access to user’s personal data for better combined 
experiences of listening to Spotify playlists on Sonos speakers. Similarly, personal 
data from Facebook is shared with Twitter so that users can update their status 
with the same message. The economic benefit of sharing real time personal data 
amongst digital applications is to create a network effect and greater lock-in to the 
services. As long as Fitbit sleep is being used by another application (e.g. 
MyFitnessPal), the individual will stay loyal to Fitbit to ensure a steady generation 
of that data for its combined experience.  
 
Given that to be the case, there is no reason why API-based OPD access cannot also 
be granted to individuals for their own benefit. 
 
Funded through more than £3m RCUK/EPSRC grants, the HAT (Hub-of-All-Things) 
and its related projects set out to design and engineer a legal, economic and 
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technological artefact (the HAT Microserver) capable of storing, processing, 
transforming and exchanging personal data and that also assigns a set of rights to 
the data to individuals themselves. Its objective is that the personal data sitting 
within the HAT Microserver can define, sui generis, a new asset class of PPD i.e. 
person-controlled personal data, the personal data where intellectual property 
rights and excludability of the data (control) is with individuals. To create the PPD 
asset class, and the artefact that contains it, the HAT was designed, engineered and 
built around the following 11 principles derived from the economic properties of 
data as a digital good: 
 
1. Principle of Co-production Access Rights without lien. Personal data has the 
axiomatic property of co-production. It is generated through human activity, but 
collected through technology owned by a firm. The individual must therefore own a 
technology/device (the HAT Microserver) that is able to collect data in such a way 
that both the firm and the individual, as co-producers, would have access rights to 
it in real time and on demand. The data accessed must be free from lien and 
encumbrances and, subject to prevailing data protection laws, allow both parties to 
reuse and reshare.  
2.  Principle of Alienable Rights. Privacy, according to many advocates, should be 
an inalienable right. Yet the challenge here is not privacy, but that OPD often 
cannot even be sufficiently isolated to assign rights. While data may not be 
assigned rights, databases are protected by US copyright law and the EU database 
directive. Database rights are specifically coded laws on the copying and 
dissemination of information in computer databases. A database is defined as "a 
collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic 
or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other means”. 
Individuals must have their own database and database rights within the HAT 
Microserver, thereby granting alienable rights for the personal data within, and 
individuals can grant these rights to others for a period according to their own 
wishes and for every data point in the database. This must be achieved by the 
individual executing a set of software code within the HAT Microserver to grant 
time- and context-dependent exchange of data with low effort. For rights to be 
assigned without ambiguity, there must also be suitable isolation of each HAT 
Microserver database from one another. A system of HAT Microservers must 
therefore be a distributed system of individual HAT Microservers owned by 
individuals themselves and yet fully interoperable with one another. 
3. Principle of Non-rivalrous Consumption. Personal data has an economic 
property of non-rivalry i.e. consumption of data by an entity does not prevent 
another entity from consuming it (Shapiro & Varian 1998). This implies that each 
co-producer may consume the data in a way that benefits itself as well as contract 
with other parties, without denying the other of consuming and contracting the 
same. That means API access from data sources into the HAT Microserver database 
on demand through HAT “data plugs” must create a copy of the data generated but 
changing the data rights once the data enters the HAT database, so as to ensure 
that each co-producer has a set of independent rights for the data that sits within 
their domain. 
  
 
9 
4. Principle of Expansibility. Personal data has the economic property of infinite 
expansibility (Rayna, 2008) . That means a firm’s data of a person can be copied to 
another space with very low marginal cost of re-production. The co-producers 
could hold the same copy of that data in the same instant that it is generated in 
their respective technological domains/devices, and they have the ability to 
contract with third parties to continue expanding its use. The HAT schema (data 
structure) allows infinite combinations of data values across datasets to be 
exchanged as a data product e.g. Tweets only in Boston, locations between 7-9am. 
Each of these data values and bundles can be named and then 
exchanged/contracted through standard APIs using standard Internet protocols and 
encryption in real time. In a similar way, the firm can do the same with their data 
(subject to prevailing laws on personal data-sharing). 
5. Principle of Excludability. Personal data have an economic non-excludability 
property, implying that it is near impossible to exclude others from consuming the 
data unless there is a legal (e.g. contract) or technological (e.g. encryption) 
framework. Excludability of personal data controlled by individuals must be based 
on a data contract and/or technological instrument whereby individuals are in a 
position to grant and/or deny rights over personal data usage. HAT Microservers 
create data debit contracts when granting rights of HAT data to others and data in 
transit is SSL-encrypted from end to end, in a similar manner to emails. 
6. Principle of Data Derivatives. Personal data have an economic property of 
recombinant and divisibility (Quah, 2003). Personal data e.g. location, combined 
with time e.g. 7-9am, can create a secondary, derived data product e.g. commuting 
journey. A new economic good can be construed as being created when different 
types of data are combined in such a way that can be exchanged, which means that 
combining personal data for new exchanges increases the underlying asset value of 
the database. An individual must control the permission and process of data being 
combined and transformed (even if it takes seconds) so that the database value 
increases. The individual must also control the usage of private AI tools on the HAT 
Microserver that creates new data. 
7. Principle of Data as Store of Value. Personal data use contracts cannot specify 
all states of nature nor all future actions and use of the data, in advance. When 
there are states or actions that cannot be verified ex post by third parties, they are 
therefore not contractible ex ante. The literature on incomplete contracts (see 
Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Aghion and Bolton 1992; 
Dewatripont and Tirole 1994) have shown that the allocation of power matters 
when it is not possible to specify in advance precisely how that power should be 
exercised. Since the value, worth and use of the data is not known, the power to 
decide on future uncertain contracts must be in the hands of the individual. 
Therefore, the HAT Microserver has to be the store of value for the individual 
before a context emerges for an exchange to occur for personalisation or 
recommendation of products and a data contract emerges. If personal data is 
available in real time and on demand, every data contract will then be complete for 
a specific use with no ambiguity and firms have less need to hoard data. 
8. Principle of Data as Medium of Exchange. The value of some personal data can 
expire (perish) if not used e.g. the need for hotel recommendations. It is therefore 
context and time dependent. Personal data must therefore be available on demand 
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and in real time to be a superior asset class as well as an effective medium of 
exchange for data contracts for personalisation and recommendation. By way of 
the HAT Microserver being a store of value and HAT APIs being the vehicle for 
exchange, HAT data, in its standardised form, should be treated as currency (like 
GBP, USD). The only missing element is its ability to be unitised but that can be 
derived empirically through increase usage, and scale. 
9. Principle of Transparency. The way personal data is stored, exchanged and 
processed and the way it stays at rest, in transit and used must be clear and 
transparently available for scrutiny. The HAT Microserver must be an open-sourced 
technology, even if services built on it can be commercial. The processing of data 
within the HAT must be based on code that is open-sourced and/or standard 
Internet technologies. The granting of data rights (usage, exclusion and alienability) 
must be transparent. 
10. Principle of Trust Anchoring. Trust is a prerequisite of contracts (Göran and 
Hägg, 1994). While the HAT Microserver technology has been legally, economically 
and technically engineered to endow IPR of personal data to individuals, it still 
needs to be issued like a private data account, much like banks issuing savings or 
current accounts. For the market to form, HAT Microservers must still be 
provisioned on license by a trust anchor, which could be the data brokers or data 
trusts, as long as there are guarantees, either by the state or through market 
incentives, to stay trustworthy. The difference is that, with IPR resting on 
individuals, the transferability of data rights can be achieved through a direct and 
complete contract, much like currency payments, even if it is enabled by data 
brokers as trust anchors.  This would therefore ensure the market viability of data 
brokers as a service for individuals. Trust anchors could also create additional 
middleware services or governance mechanisms e.g. hierarchical or nested 
relationships between HAT owners e.g. parent and child; a power of attorney 
situation; or create better heuristics of data-sharing practices across apps within 
the trust anchor’s ecosystem. 
11. Principle of Market Design. With HAT data having a set of transferable rights, it 
is now a formal economic good that can create a thin crossing point (Baldwin, 
2007) i.e. a transaction boundary for the transfer of rights. Matching of HAT data to 
apps should be dictated by market design rules of thickness, reduced congestion 
and safety (Niederle et al., 2008). Best practices of data exchange should be made 
transparent and allow different types of apps (and different levels of exposures) to 
play out that will optimise choice and privacy/security concerns.  
 
Implementation 
 
The HAT proof of concept was implemented in November 2016 on AWS (Amazon 
cloud service) as the first installation while the ability to generate a HAT 
Microserver (complete with a database) within three seconds of signing up was 
achieved in July 2017. The implementation of the HAT Microserver was optimised 
to test its cost structure and a cost of £2 to £4 per month was achieved in January 
2018. The HAT is now in live use, both in the innovation environment and in live 
commercial environment. HATs are open-sourced under AGPL, are portable and 
can be issued from most devices e.g. HATs in the cloud by different cloud 
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operators; HATs on a Raspberry Pi or even on a PC at home, or in other devices. 
However, the security architecture and threat models would differ for each 
installation, as would the business models. While one person per HAT would 
disincentivise hacking (a hack of one yields one HAT’s data), more work could be 
done from the security perspective for different types of HAT installations.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The 11 principles of the HAT data ownership model are the basis for the legal, 
economic and technical engineering of personal data rights for individuals, sui 
generis, through the HAT Microserver artefact and the re-commodification of 
personal data into a new asset class for a market to emerge. Containerising 
individuals’ data within their own databases wrapped with microservices allow 
individuals themselves to be a ‘data controller’ and ‘data processor’ for HAT data 
with low burden of effort. With HAT Microservers, individuals can own their data, 
and all the rights to it. Open-sourced HAT Microservers can therefore evolve to 
become the infrastructure for data innovation and AI, to be provisioned by trust 
anchors. In time, the aspiration is that HAT Microservers become as ubiquitous as 
PCs and smartphones, artefacts that are personal to individuals. 
 
We argue that the formation of PPD as an asset class can finally emerge a primary 
market for personal data due to its ability to create differential privacy through 
selected data (without revealing personal identifying information), bundled multi-
source data from the individuals themselves that is verifiable, data that is shareable 
in real time and on demand from the cloud and that is dynamically accurate, due to 
individuals themselves being the stakeholders of their data. The HAT Microserver 
can also install new private AI tools to generate more data from within the 
Microserver, specifically derivative, higher order and insightful data generated 
privately from the collection of data within the database; install new plugs to bring 
more data into the HAT and create data debit contracts with all applications that 
seek to request for data directly from individuals. Certification of apps are 
regulated by the HAT Community Foundation and all apps on the HAT have a triple-
letter transparent and easy-to-understand rating system for how HAT data is 
handled by the application. 
 
The HAT Project’s ultimate objective is that an explicit, primary market for personal 
data, similar to the emergence of a primary market for digital music in the early 
2000s, would reduce illegal and inefficient personal data markets as well as lessen 
externalities relating to privacy, as future applications switch to using HATs as user 
accounts. The HAT model sets up a parallel asset class to challenge the OPD asset 
class through easier access, higher quality and lower friction, much like the way 
music licensees challenged music piracy. Hoarding of personal data could also be 
reduced due to real time availability of data (through APIs) by individuals 
themselves through their HATs e.g. checking into hotels or filling forms. To date, 
there are 1400 HAT owners and the platform on Amazon Web Service is live, with 
12 pilots that are in various stages of integration with HATs. 
 
  
 
12 
 
 
References 
 
Acquisti A (2010) The Economics of Personal Data and the Economics of Privacy. 
Background Paper for OECD Joint WPISP-WPIE Roundtable, 1. 
 
Aghion P,  Bolton P (1992) An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting. The Review of Economic Studies, 59(3): 473-494. 
 
Alston LJ, Libecap GD, Schneider R (1995) Property Rights and the Preconditions for 
Markets: The Case of the Amazon Frontier. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 151(1): 89-107.  
 
Akcura MT, Srinivasan K (2005) Research Note: Customer Intimacy and Cross-Selling 
Strategy. Management Science, 51(6): 1007-1012.   
 
Anderson SP,  de Palma A (2005) A Theory of Information Overload. Unpublished 
manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Virginia. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.487.2261&rep=rep1&ty
pe=pdf 
 
August T,  Tunca T (2006) Network Software Security and User 
Incentives.Management Science, 52(11): 1703-1720. 
 
Baldwin, C. Y. (2007). Where do transactions come from? Modularity, transactions, 
and the boundaries of firms. Industrial and corporate change, 17(1), 155-195. 
  
Beresford A, Kübler D, Preibusch S (2010) Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A Field 
Experiment. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5017. .  
 
Carruthers BG, Babb SL (2000) Economy/society: Markets, Meanings, and the Social 
Structure. (Pine Forge Press, Thousand Oaks, CA) 
 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 364, p. 10, 18.12.2000, 
Article 8 
 
Demsetz H (1967) Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, 
57(2): 347-59.  
 
Dewatripont M, s Tirole J (1994) A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities 
and Manager-Shareholder Congruence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4): 
1027–1054. 
 
Grossman SJ, Hart OD (1986) The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4): 691-719. 
 
  
 
13 
Godel, M, Litchfield A, Mantovani I (2012) The Value of Personal Information: 
Evidence from Empirical Economic Studies. Communications & Strategies, 88(4th 
Quarter):  41-60.  
 
Hann IH, Hui KL, Lai YL, Lee TSY, Png IPL (2006) Who Gets Spammed? 
Communications of the ACM, 49(10): 83-87. 
 
Hart OD, Moore J (1990) Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of 
Political Economy, 98(6): 1119-1158.  
 
Laudon KC (1996) Markets and Privacy. Communications of the ACM, 39 (9): 92-
104.  
 
Odlyzko A (2003) Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the Internet. 
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce 
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) Sept 3-Oct 3, 355-366. 
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=948051  
 
Niederle M, Roth AE,  Sonmez. T (2008) Matching and Market Design. Durlauf SN, 
Blume LE.  
 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd Edition. 
 
Quah D (2003) Digital Goods and the New Economy.  Chap. 13. Jones DC, ed. New 
Economy Handbook (Elsevier Academic Press, Amsterdam)  
 
Roth AE (1991) Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics. The Economic 
Journal, 101, No. 404 (Jan., 1991), pp. 107-114 
 
Shapiro C, Varian HR (1997) US government information policy. Unpublished 
manuscript, University of California, Berkeley. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248244291.  
 
Shapiro C, Varian HR (1998) Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network 
Economy. (Harvard Business Press, Boston, MA) 
 
Swire PP, Litan RE (1998) None Of Your Business: World Data Flows, Electronic 
Commerce, and the European Privacy Directive. (Brookings Institution Press, 
Washington, D.C.) 
 
Van Zandt T (2004) Information Overload in a Network of Targeted 
Communication. The RAND Journal of Economics, 35(3): 542-560.  
 
 
 
